Spousal maintenance

Spousal maintenance is a regular payment that one spouse or civil partner is ordered or agrees to make to the other after divorce or dissolution in England and Wales. The court’s power is in section 23(1)(a) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, which allows an order that “either party to the marriage shall make to the other such periodical payments, for such term, as may be specified in the order”; the payments may be secured against capital under section 23(1)(b).[1] There is no formula and no automatic entitlement. Whether maintenance is paid, how much and for how long depend on the section 25 factors, in practice on whether one party has income needs that the marriage has generated which they cannot meet from their own resources, and on the other party’s ability to pay.[2][3]

Section 25A requires the court in every case to consider whether the parties’ financial obligations to each other can be ended “as soon after the making of the order as the court considers just and reasonable”, and where maintenance is ordered to consider limiting it to a term long enough for the recipient “to adjust without undue hardship” to independence.[4] Orders may run for the parties’ joint lives, for a fixed term, or in a nominal sum kept alive as a safety net; they end automatically on the death of either party or the recipient’s remarriage or civil partnership, and can be varied, discharged or capitalised into a lump sum under section 31.[5][6] Spousal maintenance is separate from child maintenance, which is governed by the Child Support Act 1991 and calculated by formula.[7][8]

Definition and purpose

The statutory term is periodical payments; “spousal maintenance” is the everyday name, and “alimony” is not used in English law. A periodical payments order is one of the financial provision orders defined in section 21 of the 1973 Act and is made under section 23 on or after the divorce order; it does not take effect until the divorce is made final.[1] Its purpose, as the House of Lords explained in Miller; McFarlane, is to meet the financial needs that the marriage and its breakdown have generated where capital cannot do so, and in rare cases to address the economic disparity that arises where one spouse gave up a career for the family.[9] It is not a reward, a penalty, or a share of the payer’s future earnings: the Court of Appeal held in Waggott v Waggott that an earning capacity is not a matrimonial asset to which the sharing principle applies.[10]

The Family Justice Council’s guidance describes the overall objective of provision on divorce as “a transition to independence, to the extent that that is possible in light of the choices made within the marriage”, and notes that “one party is not entitled to live for the rest of the parties’ joint lifetimes at the marital standard of living, unless he or she can afford to do so”.[11] Maintenance is therefore most often ordered where there are young children and a large income gap, or after a long marriage in which one party has been out of the workplace, and is least likely after a short childless marriage between two earners.

Section 23(1)(a) and (b) create the power to order periodical payments and secured periodical payments in favour of a party to the marriage; (d) and (e) do the same for a child of the family, subject to the Child Support Act 1991.[1][7] Section 25 sets the matters to be weighed, including under paragraph (a) each party’s income and earning capacity, “including in the case of earning capacity any increase in that capacity which it would in the opinion of the court be reasonable to expect a party to the marriage to take steps to acquire”, and under (b) their needs, obligations and responsibilities.[2] Section 25A imposes the clean break duty; section 28 fixes the maximum duration and allows the court to bar an application to extend a term; section 31 governs variation, discharge and capitalisation.[4][5][6] Interim provision before the divorce is final is made under section 22 (maintenance pending suit) and, for legal costs, section 22ZA.[12][13] Civil partners have identical rights under Schedule 5 to the Civil Partnership Act 2004.[14]

The leading first-instance statement of principle is Mostyn J’s judgment in SS v NS (Spousal Maintenance) [2014] EWHC 4183 (Fam), decided on 10 December 2014, which set out a numbered list of principles at paragraph 46 that is routinely cited.[3] The Court of Appeal’s decision in Waggott v Waggott [2018] EWCA Civ 727 and the Supreme Court’s in Mills v Mills [2018] UKSC 38 are the principal appellate authorities of the last decade.[10][15]

Who can claim and who pays

Either spouse or civil partner may apply for periodical payments against the other; the law is gender-neutral, though in practice most orders are made in favour of wives. A claim can be made only in connection with divorce, dissolution, nullity or judicial separation proceedings, and cannot be made by a person who has remarried or formed a civil partnership since the divorce (section 28(3)).[1][5] Unmarried cohabitants have no right to maintenance from each other, however long the relationship; their only claims are for their children.[16] Unless dismissed by a clean break order, a maintenance claim remains open indefinitely after the divorce.[17]

The payer is the party with the greater income. Ability to pay is assessed on net income after tax, reasonable outgoings and any child maintenance; in SS v NS Mostyn J said the court should look at the budgets globally and ask whether the figure represents “a fair proportion” of the payer’s available income.[3] A party who is not working may be credited with an earning capacity they could reasonably acquire, under section 25(2)(a).[2] Where the parties live in different countries, questions of jurisdiction arise; in Villiers v Villiers the Supreme Court held that a wife habitually resident in England could apply here for maintenance under section 27 of the 1973 Act even though the divorce itself was proceeding in Scotland.[18]

How the amount is decided

There is no calculation. The court, or the parties in negotiation, compare the recipient’s reasonable income needs with their own income (actual or attributable) to find any shortfall, and then ask what share of that shortfall the payer can fairly meet from their surplus after their own reasonable needs. In SS v NS the principles were stated as follows: an award should be made “where marriage choices have generated hard future needs”, the duration of the marriage and the presence of children being pivotal; the award should be limited to needs “save in a most exceptional case”; where the needs are not causally connected to the marriage the award should generally be limited to alleviating “significant hardship”; the court must consider a termination of payments “as soon as it is just and reasonable”; and the marital standard of living is relevant but not decisive, to be weighed against “the objective of eventual independence”.[3]

The starting point is the recipient’s budget, set out on Form E and scrutinised for items that are inflated or that belong to the marriage rather than a single household. Housing costs are usually the largest item, and in Mills v Mills the Supreme Court held that where the recipient’s housing need had been met by capital in the original settlement, a court “would need to give very good reasons for requiring a spouse to fund payment of the other spouse’s rent” after she had lost that capital through unwise decisions.[15] Child maintenance received or paid, child benefit and tax credits or Universal Credit are brought into the calculation, as is the tax position of each party. Where capital has been divided, Waggott confirms that the court may expect a recipient to use part of a sharing award to meet income needs, applying an assumed rate of return rather than requiring the capital to be preserved intact.[10]

In big money cases the “compensation” strand identified in McFarlane, where a wife had given up a career equal to her husband’s and received £250,000 a year for joint lives, is occasionally invoked, but SS v NS confines it to “a most exceptional case” and it plays no part in ordinary needs-based awards.[9][3] Online estimators exist that perform the budget comparison; one, published by Mediate UK, a Family Legal Ltd service, states that it “provides an estimate only” and that maintenance “is not automatically granted under the law in England and Wales”.[19]

Duration: joint lives, term and nominal orders

Forms of periodical payments order under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973
Type of orderDurationProvision and notes
Joint lives orderUntil the death of either party or the recipient’s remarriage or civil partnerships.28(1)(a); now uncommon except after a long marriage where independence is not realistic[5][3]
Extendable term orderA fixed term, for example five years, which the recipient may apply to extend under s.31 before it expiress.23(1)(a) with s.25A(2); in SS v NS the “statutory steer” favours this over joint lives where the choice is balanced[4][3]
Non-extendable term orderA fixed term with a direction under s.28(1A) that the recipient may not apply to extend itProvides certainty for the payer; the term must be sufficient for adjustment “without undue hardship”[5][4]
Nominal orderTypically 5p or £1 a year, for a term or joint livesKeeps the claim alive so that it can be varied upwards if circumstances change, usually while children are young[6]
Secured periodical paymentsAs above, secured on capitals.23(1)(b); survives the payer’s death; rarely used[1]
Dismissal with s.25A(3) directionNoneThe claim is dismissed and no further application may be made: a clean break[4]

Section 28(1)(a) provides that a periodical payments order may not extend beyond the death of either party or, after divorce, the recipient’s remarriage or civil partnership; section 28(1A) allows the court, when making a term order, to direct “that that party shall not be entitled to apply under section 31 below for the extension of the term specified”.[5] Where no such direction is made, the recipient can apply to extend the term, but must do so before it expires. The Family Justice Council’s guide for litigants describes a term order as “a maintenance order which only lasts for a set amount of time”, commonly “between two and five years”.[20] In Waggott the Court of Appeal replaced a joint lives order with a term order ending on a defined date, holding that the question whether a recipient can adjust without undue hardship must be approached broadly, including by asking whether it is fair for her to use part of her capital to meet income needs.[10]

The clean break duty

Section 25A(1) makes it “the duty of the court to consider whether it would be appropriate so to exercise those powers that the financial obligations of each party towards the other will be terminated as soon after the making of the order as the court considers just and reasonable”. Section 25A(2) requires the court, where it does order periodical payments, to “consider whether it would be appropriate to require those payments to be made or secured only for such term as would in the opinion of the court be sufficient to enable the party in whose favour the order is made to adjust without undue hardship to the termination of his or her financial dependence on the other party”. Section 25A(3) allows the court to dismiss a claim with a direction barring any further application.[4] The duty is to consider, not to impose: a clean break is ordered only where it is fair on the facts.

The same duty applies on variation: section 31(7)(a) requires the court, on an application to vary an order made after divorce, to consider whether to limit payments to a further period sufficient for the recipient to adjust without undue hardship.[6] In SS v NS Mostyn J summarised the position as a steer towards term orders and eventual independence, with the standard of living during the marriage to be weighed “carefully” against that objective.[3] Where a clean break on income is fair but the recipient’s needs are real, the usual solution is to increase the capital award instead, either by an unequal division of assets or by a capitalised lump sum.

Capitalisation and Duxbury

Maintenance can be converted into a single lump sum. On an original application this is done by ordering a larger capital award under section 23(1)(c) in place of periodical payments; on a later variation, section 31(7A) and (7B) allow the court, when discharging or limiting a periodical payments order, to make a lump sum, property adjustment or pension sharing order as “supplemental provision” so that the recipient is not left without support.[1][6] The sum is calculated on Duxbury principles, named after a 1987 case, which model the capital that, invested and drawn down at a steady rate while producing income and growth, would provide a given annual income for the recipient’s expected lifetime or for a fixed period; the resulting tables are published annually in the practitioners’ handbook At A Glance.[21]

A working party reconstituted in 2024, whose members included Sir Nicholas Mostyn, reviewed the assumptions and reported in November 2024. It retained the underlying investment assumptions (an income yield of 3 per cent, capital growth of 3.75 per cent and inflation of 3 per cent a year) but recommended adding an allowance for management charges, removing the assumption that the recipient receives a state pension, producing gender-neutral tables, and, most significantly, that the calculation “should no longer default to” whole-of-life provision; instead the court should consider “the likely duration of the periodical payments order which is being capitalised”.[21] Capitalisation achieves a clean break but transfers investment and longevity risk to the recipient, and is only possible where the payer has, or can raise, the capital.

Interim maintenance

Between the divorce application and the final order, the court may order maintenance pending suit under section 22: “an order requiring either party to the marriage to make to the other such periodical payments for his or her maintenance and for such term, being a term beginning not earlier than the date of the making of the application and ending with the date of the determination of the suit, as the court thinks reasonable”.[12] The test is one of immediate reasonable needs measured against the marital standard of living and the payer’s means, decided on limited evidence at a short hearing; it is not a rehearsal of the final award. Where the applicant cannot fund legal representation and “is not reasonably able to secure a loan”, the court may make a legal services payment order under section 22ZA requiring the other party to pay towards their costs.[13] Applications for periodical payments alone follow the fast-track procedure in Part 9 of the Family Procedure Rules, with a first hearing six to ten weeks after issue.[22]

Variation, remarriage and cohabitation

A periodical payments order can be varied, suspended, revived or discharged under section 31, which lists maintenance pending suit, periodical payments, secured periodical payments and lump sums by instalments among the orders that can be varied; on a variation the court considers “all the circumstances of the case”, first consideration being given to the welfare of any child under eighteen, and “any change in any of the matters to which the court was required to have regard” when the order was made.[6] The order ends automatically on the death of either party or the recipient’s remarriage or civil partnership, and a recipient who remarries loses the right to apply for any financial provision or property adjustment order against the former spouse (section 28(3)).[5]

Cohabitation is different. A recipient who lives with a new partner does not lose maintenance automatically, but the cohabitation and the partner’s actual or potential contribution to the household are relevant on a variation application. In Grey v Grey the Court of Appeal held that the court must investigate the cohabitant’s means, and Thorpe LJ said that “The real question will generally be not what is he contributing but what ought he to contribute.”[23] Many consent orders include a term reducing or ending maintenance after a defined period of cohabitation, commonly six months, and the Family Justice Council’s guide lists cohabitation for more than six months among common trigger events.[20] Other typical grounds for variation are retirement, redundancy, illness, a significant rise or fall in either income, or the children reaching independence. Variation applications within existing proceedings carry a court fee of £195 on notice or £62 by consent (13 July 2026).[24]

Distinction from child maintenance

Spousal maintenance is for the former spouse; child maintenance is for the children. The two are calculated differently, last for different periods and are enforced by different bodies. Child maintenance is governed by the Child Support Act 1991 and, where the parents cannot agree, is calculated by the Child Maintenance Service by a percentage formula applied to the paying parent’s gross income; GOV.UK states that an arrangement is required while a child is under 16, or under 20 in approved education or training.[8] Section 8 of the 1991 Act prevents the divorce court from making a child maintenance order where the Service could make a calculation, except by consent, as a top-up above the Service’s income ceiling, for school fees, or for the costs of a child’s disability.[7]

In practice the two interact: child maintenance paid or received is deducted from or added to the parties’ budgets before spousal maintenance is assessed, and an order for spousal maintenance is sometimes expressed as a global figure that includes the children in a consent order. The differences are set out on Family Law Wiki’s page on child maintenance, and in a comparison published by ChildMaintenance.org.uk, an information site operated by Family Legal Ltd, the publisher of this wiki, which is not connected to the Child Maintenance Service.[16][7]

Procedure and cost

Maintenance is usually agreed as part of an overall financial settlement, often in financial mediation, and made binding by a consent order approved after the conditional order on Form A by consent with a Form D81, for a fee of £62.[25][24] Where it is disputed, either party applies on Form A after a MIAM, paying £321, and the case proceeds under Part 9 of the Family Procedure Rules through a first appointment, a financial dispute resolution appointment and, if necessary, a final hearing; the court process is described on Family Court Wiki.[26][24][22] MoneyHelper puts a solicitor’s total cost for a negotiated settlement at £2,000 to £3,000 and a contested case to final hearing at £30,000 plus VAT or more.[27] Arrears of maintenance are enforced through the Family Court, including by attachment of earnings; enforcement is covered on Family Court Wiki.

Statistics

The Ministry of Justice does not publish the number of periodical payments orders made, their amounts or their duration; financial remedy statistics count applications and disposals only. In January to March 2026 there were 12,646 financial remedy applications, 73 per cent of them uncontested.[28] The Law Commission’s 2024 scoping report noted the absence of data on outcomes as a barrier to assessing the law, and examined “time limits on spousal maintenance obligations” as a candidate for reform.[29] The most recent ONS release, for 2023, records 102,678 divorces and a median marriage duration at divorce of 12.7 years for opposite-sex couples.[30]

History

Development of spousal maintenance law in England and Wales
DateDevelopment
1 January 1971Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970, consolidated in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973: periodical payments, secured payments and lump sums available on divorce with a statutory list of factors[1]
12 October 1984Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 inserts section 25A (clean break duty) and section 28(1A) (bar on extending a term), and removes the objective of placing the parties in the position they would have been in had the marriage not broken down[4][5]
1987Duxbury v Duxbury: the capitalisation model later known by that name is first used[21]
5 April 1993Child Support Act 1991 in force: child maintenance removed from the courts in most cases[7]
24 May 2006McFarlane: periodical payments of £250,000 a year restored without a term; the three strands of fairness identified[9]
10 December 2014SS v NS: Mostyn J’s numbered principles on spousal maintenance[3]
11 April 2018Waggott v Waggott: earning capacity is not shared; joint lives order replaced by a term order[10]
18 July 2018Mills v Mills: no obligation to fund rent where housing need was met by the original capital award[15]
November 2024Duxbury Working Party final report recommends abandoning the whole-of-life default[21]
18 December 2024Law Commission scoping report examines time limits on spousal maintenance[29]
5 June 2026Ministry of Justice consultation proposes codifying the needs principle; closed 14 August 2026[31]

Criticism and reform

Spousal maintenance is the most contested part of financial remedy law. Critics, including the sponsors of a series of private members’ Bills in the House of Lords, argue that England and Wales is out of step with Scotland and much of Europe, where maintenance is normally limited to a few years, and that open-ended orders discourage independence; the Law Commission’s 2024 scoping report listed “time limits on spousal maintenance obligations” among the issues for government to consider.[29] Defenders reply that the courts already apply a strong steer towards term orders, as SS v NS and Waggott show, and that a fixed limit would fall hardest on older women who gave up careers during long marriages and cannot recover an earning capacity.[3][10][11]

The Ministry of Justice’s June 2026 consultation, “A fairer end to relationships”, proposes a codification-plus model in which needs, including “capital and income needs”, would be set out in statute in a hierarchy after the welfare of children; it does not propose a fixed maximum term. It also proposes a separate needs-led scheme for cohabitants, which would for the first time allow limited financial claims between unmarried partners.[31] A second criticism concerns transparency: the absence of any published data on the frequency, amount and duration of maintenance orders makes it impossible to say how the law operates in ordinary cases, and the Duxbury Working Party’s 2024 report was itself prompted by concern that a whole-of-life default overstated capitalised awards.[29][21]

Getting help

See also

References

  1. Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 23: Financial provision orders in connection with divorce proceedings, etc.. legislation.gov.uk. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  2. Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 25: Matters to which court is to have regard in deciding how to exercise its powers. legislation.gov.uk. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  3. SS v NS (Spousal Maintenance) [2014] EWHC 4183 (Fam). Find Case Law, The National Archives. 10 December 2014. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  4. Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 25A: Exercise of court’s powers in favour of party to marriage on divorce or nullity. legislation.gov.uk. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  5. Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 28: Duration of continuing financial provision orders in favour of party to marriage. legislation.gov.uk. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  6. Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 31: Variation, discharge, etc., of certain orders for financial relief. legislation.gov.uk. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  7. Child Support Act 1991, section 8: Role of the courts with respect to maintenance for children. legislation.gov.uk. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  8. Child Maintenance Service: what child maintenance is. GOV.UK. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  9. Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24. House of Lords. 24 May 2006. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  10. Waggott v Waggott [2018] EWCA Civ 727. Find Case Law, The National Archives. 11 April 2018. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  11. Guidance on ‘Financial Needs’ on Divorce. Family Justice Council. June 2016. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  12. Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 22: Maintenance pending suit. legislation.gov.uk. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  13. Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 22ZA: Orders for payment in respect of legal services. legislation.gov.uk. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  14. Civil Partnership Act 2004, Schedule 5: Financial relief. legislation.gov.uk. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  15. Mills v Mills [2018] UKSC 38. Find Case Law, The National Archives. 18 July 2018. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  16. Spousal maintenance: how it differs from child maintenance. ChildMaintenance.org.uk (Family Legal Ltd). updated 18 July 2026. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  17. Wyatt v Vince [2015] UKSC 14. Find Case Law, The National Archives. 11 March 2015. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  18. Villiers v Villiers [2020] UKSC 30. Find Case Law, The National Archives. 1 July 2020. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  19. Spousal maintenance calculator. Mediate UK (Family Legal Ltd). updated July 2026. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  20. Sorting out Finances on Divorce. Family Justice Council. March 2024. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  21. Report of the Duxbury Working Party (final), November 2024. Financial Remedies Journal. November 2024. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  22. Family Procedure Rules 2010, Part 9: Applications for a financial remedy. Ministry of Justice. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  23. Grey v Grey [2009] EWCA Civ 1424. Find Case Law, The National Archives. December 2009. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  24. Family court fees (EX50). HM Courts and Tribunals Service. updated 13 July 2026. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  25. Money and property when you divorce or separate: apply for a consent order. GOV.UK. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  26. Money and property when you divorce or separate: get the court to decide. GOV.UK. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  27. How much does divorce or dissolution cost?. MoneyHelper. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  28. Family Court Statistics Quarterly, January to March 2026. Ministry of Justice. 25 June 2026. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  29. Law Commission publishes scoping report on financial remedies on divorce. Law Commission of England and Wales. 18 December 2024. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  30. Divorces and dissolutions in England and Wales: 2023. Office for National Statistics. 2 July 2025. Accessed 5 September 2026.
  31. A fairer end to relationships: consultation document. Ministry of Justice. 5 June 2026. Accessed 5 September 2026.

This article is part of Divorce Law Wiki, published by Family Legal Ltd. It is general information about the law of England and Wales, not legal advice. Last reviewed 6 September 2026. About this site and editorial policy · Report an error.